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Abstract 
Politics in democracy and dictatorship is markedly different; democracy and dictatorship are also associated with dis-
tinct policy outcomes. Do political regimes also select different leaders, i.e., do democratic leaders have distinct per-
sonal backgrounds to those of their peers in dictatorships, do they tend to hold different prior careers and posts while 
climbing the “greasy pole” of politics? The aim of this paper is to introduce the new data on leaders’ careers in democ-
racy and dictatorship and compare their personal background, experience in politics, careers and significant posts prior 
to their tenure, and details about their time in office, inter alia. In general, democratic leaders differ from nondemo-
cratic ones in terms of their educational, social and career background. The paper also finds significant differences 
among leaders in different nondemocratic regimes, and suggests possible venues for further research. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars have long investigated the effects of demo-
cratic and nondemocratic institutions on leaders’ be-
haviour in office, the probability of and manner of exit 
from that office, particularly during and after military 
conflict (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & 
Morrow, 2003; Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015; Goe-
mans, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Weeks, 2012). Such studies 
have often relied on the pioneering data set on politi-
cal leaders, Archigos, that included general details 
about leaders’ time in office, exit and fate (Goemans, 
Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009). Alongside research that 
looked at the effects of institutions on leaders, studies 
equally exist that examine the effects of leaders and 
their personal traits. Because such studies require 
more detailed information about leaders’ personal 
background which is not covered by the Archigos, the 
majority of scholars have to undergo their own signifi-
cant data-collection efforts pertaining to some aspect 
of leaders’ personal background and traits. As a result, 
the new wave of leadership studies in political science 
and economics is extremely data-intensive (e.g., Alexi-
adou, 2015; Baturo, 2014; Besley & Reynal-Querol, 
2011; Byman & Pollack, 2001; Colgan, 2013; Dreher, 
Lein, Lamla, & Somogyi, 2009; Hayo & Neumeier, 2014; 
Horowitz & Stam, 2014; McDermott, 2007). While sev-
eral new cross-national data sets have emerged that 
are able to account for various aspects of leaders’ 
background and traits (e.g., Dreher et al., 2009; Ellis, 
Horowitz & Stam, 2015; Gerring, Oncel, Morrison, & 
Keefer, 2014; Ludwig, 2002), the majority of leadership 
studies focus, and provide data on, very specific as-
pects of leaders’ personal background (e.g., Besley & 
Reynal-Querol, 2011; Byman & Pollack, 2001; Horowitz 
& Stam, 2014); many only cover particular geographic 
regions or political regimes, e.g., only democracies or 
presidential regimes (e.g., Alexiadou, 2015; Baturo, 
2014; Pérez-Liñán, 2009). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces 
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new cross-national data that makes a significant con-
tribution to our knowledge about leaders, in particular 
providing very detailed information about their ca-
reers, experience, and prior posts. Second, it provides 
detailed comparisons of leaders in democracy and dic-
tatorship, as well as of leaders across different non-
democratic regimes. The title of the new data set, Cur-
sus Honorum, i.e., career ladder in Latin, is chosen 
partly to honour the groundbreaking Archigos dataset 
on political leaders developed by Goemans et al. (2009) 
in which Archigos is the Greek term for ruler. However, 
the term Cursus Honorum, apart from its similar conno-
tations to antiquity, also neatly describes the key as-
pects of the data that distinguish it from other data 
sources on political leaders. In particular, Cursus Hono-
rum accounts for various aspects of political careers of 
leaders over long periods of time prior to assuming po-
litical office and even after.1 The data set includes cer-
tain biographical details about leaders, their back-
ground, education, and professional experiences that 
the existing datasets on national political leaders also 
include albeit often for different country samples or 
other time periods (e.g., Alexiadou, 2015; Besley & 
Reynal-Querol, 2011; Dreher et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 
2015; Ludwig, 2002). The Cursus Honorum, however, 
offers much more detailed data on educational attain-
ment, prior political posts and political experience, de-
tails about time in office and post-tenure occupations. 
Also, the data set extends the coverage from 2004—
the Archigos covers until the end of 2004—to 2010. 
The second aim is to compare the backgrounds and 
careers of political leaders in democracy and dictator-
ship. The systematic analysis of leaders’ distinct careers 
and traits will enhance our understanding of elite poli-
tics and recruitment and how distinct political regimes 
operate. Therefore, having introduced the new data in 
the section below, the section that follows compares 
leaders in democracy and dictatorship in terms of their 
general and family background, education, prior ca-
reers and posts, as well as experience. In brief, demo-
cratic leaders are better educated, more likely to have 
law and economics degrees, and tend to hold more 
significant political posts prior to office. I also examine 
leaders across different nondemocratic regimes and 
find that leaders in military regimes are more likely to 
have middle-class family backgrounds than those in 
                                                          
1 Goodman (1997, p. 23) refers to cursus honorum as “the rigid 
hierarchy of the cursus honorum, the steps by which a man ad-
vanced to the peak of a political career, the consulship, or, for a 
select few, appointment as one of the two censors.” Further-
more, cursus honorum continued even after the Romans at-
tained the supreme magistracies: “The true glory of senatorial 
life, then, lay in the magistracies for which senators alone were 
eligible….[T]he proconsulship of Asia or Africa retained the 
highest esteem and became the acme of the senatorial cursus. 
By tradition, only the most senior ex-consuls were nominated 
for Africa and Asia” (Goodman, 1997, p. 168). 
other regime types. At the same time, leaders in party 
regimes, in terms of their careers and experience, have 
more in common with democratic leaders than with 
other dictators. In the final section, I briefly review the 
scholarship on leaders and discuss possible empirical 
applications of the new data including the analyses of 
linkages between particular careers and policies in of-
fice or the effects of political experience on policy-
making and survival in office, among other things.  
2. An Overview of the Cursus Honorum Data 
In addition to the Archigos data (Goemans et al., 2009) 
discussed above, other datasets about political leaders 
exist and will almost certainly appear in the future.2 
Dreher et al. (2009), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) 
and Ellis et al. (2015) also collected data on various as-
pects of the personal background of political leaders. 
Ellis et al. (2015) focus mainly on military aspects of the 
personal background of leaders from 1875–2004, how-
ever, their data also include other important aspects 
such as leaders’ family and educational details. In turn, 
Dreher et al. (2009) examine the impact of the individ-
ual background of 500 political leaders from 73 coun-
tries on economic reform from 1970—2002.3 Likewise, 
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) include variables on 
the educational attainment of leaders from 1872–
2004, following the eight-way classification of Ludwig 
(2002). In turn, Gerring et al. (2014) cover not only con-
temporaneous leaders but also those in the top eche-
lon of political elites.  
Inevitably, the Cursus Honorum data set introduced 
herein shares several indicators with existing datasets. 
However, the Cursus Honorum offers new variables, 
especially those related to specific details of leaders’ 
political career paths. The data include more than 50 
various indicators pertaining to personal background, 
such as previous career and significant posts prior to 
assuming office, number of years in formal politics, ed-
ucational background, whether they were ever jailed, 
the military rank of current or former military officers, 
indicators pertaining to their time in office and entry 
and exit from that office, as well as post-leadership ca-
reer. Several variables from the data set first appeared 
                                                          
2 Arguably, with a notable exception of a cross-national study 
by Bienen and van de Walle (1991) or several studies of per-
sonal characteristics, recruitment and careers of political elites 
in Western democracies (Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972; Putnam, 
1973), the majority of earlier studies generally did not rely on, 
nor introduce new empirical data about leaders (e.g., Blondel, 
1987). 
3 It appears that political scientists and economists study simi-
lar phenomena in isolation: Dreher et al. (2009, p. 171) 
acknowledged that they collated the list of leaders inde-
pendently without prior knowledge of the existing Archigos da-
taset which has long been a standard in political science (Goe-
mans et al., 2009). 
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in Baturo (2014). The Cursus Honorum data set covers 
1,501 political leaders in office from the 1960–2010 pe-
riod, including interim leaders, in all countries (except 
small island nations), in democratic and non-
democratic regimes.4 
In general, Cursus Honorum variables may be divid-
ed into several groups, as seen from Table 1. First, the 
data include general information about leaders such as 
the name of the effective chief political executive and 
time in office.5 Likewise, the data include common 
                                                          
4 The Cursus Honorum data were mainly collected from 2009–
10 (updated in 2012–14), apart from Archigos at that time I 
was not familiar with the existing large-n datasets on rulers’ 
personal background. The sources used include country political 
histories, leaders’ biographies, reference works, government 
websites, newspaper archives, book references, such as Bienen 
and van de Walle (1991) or Lentz (1994), as well as web refer-
ences, such as www.rulers.org, www.worldstatesmen.com, Zar-
ate (2011). For example, political biographies of Swiss leaders 
were sourced from Historical Dictionary, http://www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/. The indicators vary in their reliability, e.g., political ca-
reer or prior political post are generally reliable because such 
facts are usually reported by the majority of bibliographic 
sources and are not subject to interpretation. In case of other 
variables, such as number of years in formal politics, a certain 
degree of subjectivity is unavoidable. 
5 If the same individual assumes office again in non-consecutive 
country identifiers and leaders’ age.6 Rulers’ names 
and identifiers correspond to those in the Archigos da-
ta (Goemans et al., 2009), with additions from 2005–10 
and revisions whenever required, e.g., leaders of São 
Tomé e Príncipe, for instance, who were not included 
in the Archigos. 
In addition, the data include several indicators of 
general family background. Political family accounts for 
whether a leader is a member of a prominent political 
family or dynasty—for example, the Gandhis in India, 
where members of the leader’s family have occupied 
the highest national political posts in the past—
whenever possible to ascertain. There is also an indica-
tor for whether leaders were known to have been in 
jail any time prior to assuming office, excluding short 
detentions for minor misdemeanours, e.g., violations 
of public peace. 
                                                                                           
terms, e.g., Kérékou of Benin in 1972–91 and in 1996–2006, such 
a ruler is included as, e.g., “Kérékou” and as “Kérékou 2”. Corre-
spondingly, several indicator variables are adjusted, e.g., years in 
formal politics for Kérékou 2 (Kérékou in 1996–2006) additionally 
include his years as president in 1972–91. Another indicator ex-
ists that identifies the same individual as one ruler. 
6 Age is available for all rulers but Bonifacio Ondó Edu of Equa-
torial Guinea (1963–68) who is reported to have been born in 
1920s by two sources, coded as 1925 (middle year for that 
decade) in the data. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
General Indicators:      
Age at entry into office 53.282 10.649 17 85 1500 
Age at exit from office 58.694 11.039 19 90 1500 
Tenure in office, years 5.488 7.048 0.003 51.836 1501 
Gender 0.033 0.180 0 1 1501 
Political family 0.148 0.355 0 1 1497 
Family background, lower 0.219 0.413 0 1 1501 
Family background, middle 0.570 0.495 0 1 1501 
Family background, upper 0.211 0.408 0 1 1501 
Ever been imprisoned 0.149 0.356 0 1 1495 
Revolutionary or opposition1 0.181 0.385 0 1 1495 
      
Education variables:      
Education, detail (description) – – – – 1260 
3rd-level education 0.815 0.389 0 1 1501 
PhD degree 0.130 0.336 0 1 1487 
3rd level education abroad 0.360 0.480 0 1 1463 
Soviet education 0.027 0.162 0 1 1485 
Education, categories:2*     1260 
Law 0.278 0.448 0 1 1501 
No 3rd-level education 0.185 0.389 0 1 1501 
Economics 0.126 0.332 0 1 1501 
Military and staff colleges 0.117 0.322 0 1 1501 
Humanities 0.083 0.276 0 1 1501 
Engineering 0.065 0.247 0 1 1501 
Political science 0.043 0.202 0 1 1501 
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Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
Medicine 0.030 0.171 0 1 1501 
Science, various 0.019 0.138 0 1 1501 
Degree, unknown 0.015 0.123 0 1 1501 
Theology 0.013 0.115 0 1 1501 
Agriculture or agronomy 0.013 0.112 0 1 1501 
Marxist philosophy, i.e., party school 0.009 0.096 0 1 1501 
      
Prior career variables:      
Years in formal politics 12.211 10.793 0 52 1490 
Years, including in civil service 15.663 11.782 0 52 1488 
Career, detail (description) – – – – 1500 
Post-career, detail (description) – – – – 1171 
Prior career, categories:*     1500 
Legislative/party career 0.467 0.499 0 1 1500 
Career in military/security 0.179 0.384 0 1 1500 
Civil servant or diplomat 0.063 0.244 0 1 1500 
Minister, various 0.060 0.238 0 1 1500 
Academic career 0.051 0.219 0 1 1500 
Ruler’s relative 0.047 0.211 0 1 1500 
Businessman 0.025 0.157 0 1 1500 
Rebel or revolutionary 0.023 0.151 0 1 1500 
Governor or mayor 0.019 0.138 0 1 1500 
Mayor of capital city 0.019 0.138 0 1 1500 
Judiciary 0.017 0.131 0 1 1500 
Trade unionist 0.011 0.106 0 1 1500 
Prior significant post, categories:3*      
PM (earlier) 0.063 0.243 0 1 1459 
Minister, foreign affairs 0.037 0.189 0 1 1459 
Minister, finance 0.036 0.187 0 1 1459 
Vice-president 0.034 0.180 0 1 1459 
House speaker 0.030 0.171 0 1 1459 
Minister, defence 0.025 0.157 0 1 1459 
Chief of general (army) staff 0.023 0.151 0 1 1459 
Politburo member 0.015 0.122 0 1 1459 
      
Military background variables:      
Military rank (description) – – – – 336 
Military rank (NATO equivalent) – – – – 336 
Top NATO rank – – – – 336 
      
Variables in relation to the time in office:      
Political outsider 0.101 0.301 0 1 1500 
Father of the nation 0.067 0.251 0 1 1501 
Collective leadership 0.055 0.227 0 1 1501 
Leader’s political party (description) – – – – 1339 
Communist (extreme left) party 0.065 0.246 0 1 1420 
Entry type, categories:*     1501 
Election 0.398 0.490 0 1 1501 
Selected in parliament 0.207 0.405 0 1 1501 
Coup 0.123 0.328 0 1 1501 
Interim 0.097 0.296 0 1 1501 
Selection, various 0.091 0.288 0 1 1501 
Civil war or revolt 0.025 0.155 0 1 1501 
Constitutional succession 0.019 0.138 0 1 1501 
Royal succession 0.019 0.138 0 1 1501 
Dedazo 0.011 0.103 0 1 1501 
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Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
Foreign installed 0.010 0.099 0 1 1501 
Post-career, categories (description) -- -- -- -- 1171 
Exit type, categories:     1501 
Step down/resign 0.327 0.469 0 1 1501 
Term limits 0.166 0.372 0 1 1501 
Coup 0.138 0.345 0 1 1501 
Lost elections 0.133 0.340 0 1 1501 
In office 0.111 0.315 0 1 1501 
Died in office 0.062 0.241 0 1 1501 
Civil war or revolt 0.035 0.185 0 1 1501 
Killed 0.019 0.135 0 1 1501 
Replaced by foreign powers 0.009 0.093 0 1 1501 
Note: *Some leaders receive education in more than one discipline, serve in more than one significant post, or have 
more than one prior career. In such cases, there is an accompanying variable with additional categories included. 1 In-
volved in a revolutionary movement or opposition in a prior non-democratic regime, or in an anti-colonial struggle. 2 
Most significant categories are included, i.e., psychology or pedagogy are omitted from the table. 3 Several prior posts 
are displayed only, there exist more categories. 
The data also account for the family background of 
leaders, whether they come from upper, middle, or 
working/lower-middle class families. In some cases 
family class origins are difficult to ascertain, however.7 
For example, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, par-
ticularly in the colonial period, the meaning of family 
class background is very different from what is under-
stood by class in industrialised nations. Therefore, 
whenever possible, equivalent class categories were 
gauged in the context of social hierarchy, e.g., the fami-
ly of the village chief or that of the missioners was as-
signed into the “middle” category. Altogether, 22 per 
cent of leaders have a working or lower-middle class 
family background, 21 per cent hail from upper-class 
origins, and the majority, 57 per cent, are from the 
middle ranks.  
The second group of indicators is related to leaders’ 
education. Education, detail (description) includes the 
raw data on leaders’ education: detailed in 48 catego-
ries, e.g., classics; liberal arts (others); business admin-
istration; military academy, West Point; military acad-
emy, Saint-Cyr; military academy, Sandhurst; military 
academy, others, and so on. Altogether, 82 per cent of 
leaders have completed third-level (university or 
equivalent) education. The education of military offic-
ers is coded as third-level education only if such offic-
ers attended undergraduate degree-granting institu-
tions, such as Saint-Cyr, the Soviet third-level military 
schools (following the late 1950s transition from two-
year (non-third-level) military schools into four-year 
higher education institutions. In turn, Education, detail 
                                                          
7 Also, in 17 per cent of observations (253 leaders out of 1,501) 
bibliographic sources do not disclose family social origins or fa-
ther’s profession explicitly and therefore family status was im-
puted based on other available information about leaders’ 
younger years. There is an auxiliary indicator to mark these ob-
servations so they can be recoded as missing instead. 
(description) is aggregated into Education, categories 
with fifteen categories: 28 per cent of leaders received 
a law education, 13 per cent—economics or related 
discipline, 12 per cent—graduated from military and 
military staff institutions, and so on.  
There is also a Ph.D. indicator whenever a leader 
holds a doctorate, excluding honorary doctorates, e.g., 
Alberto Fujimori of Peru does not hold a Ph.D. despite 
being a university academic prior to presidency, only 
an honorary Ph.D., therefore Fujimori is coded as not 
having a doctorate. There are also several indicators re-
lated to whether leaders received their education 
abroad. Three per cent of non-Soviet leaders received 
their university education, fully or partly, in the USSR 
or a Soviet satellite country during the Cold War. If 
leaders received more than one third-level education 
in different fields, their second education is also in-
cluded in a second, additional Education, categories 
variable, e.g., Ramalho Eanes (1976–86) of Portugal re-
ceived a third-level military, and later, legal, degree. 
Both types are accounted for. 
The third group of indicators covers various aspects 
of rulers’ prior careers. Career, detail (description) pro-
vides the raw description. Prior career, categories gives 
16 categories for a primary career before office: aca-
demic, businessman, career in military/security, civil 
servant or diplomat, governor or mayor, international 
development or the EU, journalist, judiciary, lawyer, 
legislative/party career, mayor of capital city, ministe-
rial appointments, priest, rebel or career revolutionary, 
ruler’s relative, trade unionist. Because some careers 
are difficult to categorise in one category, Prior career 
2 accounts for their second significant career, if there is 
any. Altogether, 47 per cent of leaders have mainly leg-
islative or political party careers, 18 per cent have a ca-
reer in military or security apparatus, and six per cent 
are former civil servants or diplomats.  
There are also two variables for the length of politi-
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cal experience prior to assuming the highest political 
office. Years in formal politics account for years in offi-
cial politics, such as being a member of parliament, 
cabinet minister, province governor or city mayor, or 
member of a sub-national parliament, while the second 
indicator additionally accounts for any political activity 
including party membership, working in civil service, or 
colonial administration. Furthermore, Prior significant 
post, categories variable provides additional details of 
political experience such as significant political posts 
occupied prior to assuming office, e.g., those of finance 
minister, defence minister, membership of the politbu-
ro, or head of royal military household, etc. Altogether, 
there are three separate significant post variables, with 
some leaders assigned only one significant prior post if 
they only had one. From these data it is possible to as-
certain not only the ruler’s prior career path but also 
the degree of affinity with previous rulers, e.g., wheth-
er the current leader is a close relative of the previous 
one, or a designated successor. 
The fourth group includes details regarding wheth-
er a leader is a career military officer or a former mili-
tary officer, excluding leaders who underwent manda-
tory military training or military draft in the past. The 
data also include indicators for the highest military 
rank obtained by rulers prior to assuming office, as well 
as their highest rank in the national military at the 
time.8 Another group of indicators relates to what hap-
pens to leaders after leaving office. Post-career, cate-
gories assigns former leaders’ pursuits into several cat-
egories, such as ambassador, arrested and/or 
imprisoned, business, civil servant, died/incapacitated 
in office, exile, cabinet minister, non-profit or academ-
ic, and so on. The post-tenure categories may also be 
desegregated and aggregated into a smaller or larger 
number of categories. In turn, the final group of varia-
bles includes various details pertaining to leaders’ time 
in office, or the type of entry and exit from office, e.g., 
constitutional succession, term limits, or a coup. Also, 7 
per cent of leaders are Fathers of the nation, 6 per cent 
rule under collective leadership, 7 per cent are from 
the Communist, Marxist or any other extreme-left par-
ty family, among other things.  
3. Leaders and their Careers in Democracy and 
Dictatorship 
The democratic form of government is lauded for vari-
ous positive policy outcomes, e.g., higher education 
spending (Stasavage, 2005), better healthcare 
(Kudamatsu, 2012), more effective control of corrup-
tion, albeit only after a long history of democracy 
                                                          
8 Where a ruler is a retired officer at the time of assuming of-
fice, the rank at the time of retirement is used, whenever such 
data are available. Ranks bestowed on leaders while in office 
are not counted, only those received prior. 
(Treisman, 2000), and steadier economic growth rates 
(Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000), 
among other things. Democracy also attracts better 
educated, and therefore generally better—because the 
superior education of leaders arguably signals their 
honesty and competence—political leaders (Besley & 
Reynal-Querol, 2011). The difference between leaders 
in democracy and dictatorship does not have to be 
confined to educational attainment, however. Rulers 
may vary in terms of the type of education, family 
background, typical career paths and length thereof, 
and the significant political posts they are expected to 
attain on their way to the highest office, among other 
things. In turn, a better understanding of leaders’ dis-
tinct careers and traits may improve our knowledge of 
elite politics and recruitment across different political 
regimes. 
In this section I demonstrate how the Cursus Hono-
rum data can be employed to investigate whether de-
mocracy and dictatorship are associated with “differ-
ent” leaders. Because the primary aim of this paper is 
to introduce and discuss the data, I forsake a more de-
tailed discussion as to why political regimes may ele-
vate and “select” as their leaders those individuals who 
share particular background traits. Instead, I rely on 
previous scholarship that examined the selection of 
leaders in comparative context (e.g., Besley & Reynal-
Querol, 2011; Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; Dreher et 
al., 2009; Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972; Pérez-Liñán, 
2009). Based on this literature, the expectation is that 
democracies are more likely to feature leaders with a 
better education (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011), 
legal background, education in law and economics 
(e.g., Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972), and to have longer 
political careers and experience (e.g., Linz, 1994). In 
contrast, leaders in non-democracies are more likely to 
have lower education (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 
2011), military background (e.g., Bienen & van de 
Walle, 1991; Svolik, 2012), shorter political careers, and 
less experience (e.g., Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; 
Ludwig, 2002). 
For the sake of comparison, leaders in democracies 
are those who enter office in a year when their country 
has a Polity2 score of +6 and above, and leaders in dic-
tatorships are those who enter when the Polity2 score 
is lower than +6. Several countries not covered by Mar-
shall and Jaggers (2011) are coded as democracies if 
they are categorised as “Free” by the Freedom House 
however, for example, Barbados, Bahamas and Iceland. 
Differences in personal background are presented 
in several graphs. The background categories are sort-
ed by the magnitude of differences between leaders in 
two political regimes. In other words, democratic and 
nondemocratic leaders are most different in terms of 
categories at the top of each figure, and they are the 
most similar at the bottom. Figure 1 displays differ-
ences in general and family background, in per cent. 
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The results indicate that democracies and dictatorships 
have a similar percentage of leaders who are political 
outsiders, were imprisoned in the past, or hail from 
prominent political families, as these categories are at 
the bottom of Figure 1. Non-democratic leaders are four 
years younger than their democratic counterparts, at 51 
years when they enter office. The biggest difference, 
however, is in terms of middle-class family background: 
63 per cent of leaders in democracies are middle-class as 
opposed to 51 per cent in non-democracies. Also, 25 per 
cent of rulers in dictatorships spring from a lower class 
background versus 19 per cent in democracies. 
Figure 2 displays differences in leaders’ education. 
Earlier studies found the predominance of former law-
yers in democracies (Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972). As 
expected therefore, there are more lawyers among 
democrats, and more leaders with education in military 
and staff colleges exist among dictators. Likewise, 28 
per cent of rulers in non-democracies—versus only 10 
per cent in democracies—have no college education. In 
democracies, 18 per cent hold degrees in economics, 
17 per cent have Ph.D. degrees and 10 per cent hold 
undergraduate degrees in humanities—versus only 7, 8 
and 6 per cent respectively in dictatorships. However, 
democratic leaders are, broadly speaking, not that dif-
ferent in terms of whether they received their educa-
tion abroad in general (33 v. 39 per cent), or in the 
countries of the Soviet block in particular. There are only 
40 rulers with Soviet education altogether, e.g., Bachelet 
of Chile who studied medicine in the GDR, or Dos Santos 
of Angola with a Soviet engineering degree.9 
In general, democratic leaders do seem to have a 
better education overall, in line with previous findings 
in Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) who also stipulated 
that the improved education of leaders was related to 
their competence and public-spiritedness. This argu-
ment is debatable, however, as in former or current 
authoritarian regimes where formal education lacks in 
civic classes and democratic learning, better education 
may equally indoctrinate (Klingemann, 1966). Also, 
Carnes and Lupu (2015, p. 47) find that university-
educated leaders do not perform any better—i.e., do 
not govern during periods of higher economic growth, 
do not pass more legislative bills, are no less corrupt. 
                                                          
9 Leaders in the (former) USSR or Soviet satellite countries who 
received their education in their home countries during the 
Cold war are not included in the Soviet education category, i.e., 
Soviet education must be received abroad. An East European 
leader with an education in the USSR is regarded to have re-
ceived a Soviet education as opposed to a leader who received 
it in his own East European country during the Cold war. 
 
Figure 1. General background of political leaders. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders in democracy and dic-
tatorship with particular traits. However, Age at entry includes the average values instead of percentage. Categories are 
sorted by differences between leaders who enter office in more and less democratic regimes as explained in text. 
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Figure 2. Education of political leaders. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders in democracy and dictatorship 
with particular educational background. Selected categories are displayed only (e.g., theology, agronomy and other in-
frequent categories are omitted). All categories are the field of study except Education abroad, Soviet education, and 
Ph.D. which can be in any field. Categories are sorted by differences between leaders who enter office in more and less 
democratic regimes. 
We can also compare leaders’ prior careers and the 
posts they tend to occupy prior to tenure in the highest 
office. In Figure 3, 65 per cent of leaders (the bar is 
truncated in the interest of visibility) in democracies 
and 28 per cent in non-democracies have predomi-
nantly legislative or party careers. However, 34 per 
cent in dictatorships—versus only 3 per cent in democ-
racies—come from military or security career paths. 
Even excluding leaders in military regimes, 21 per cent 
of rulers in monarchies, party and personal regimes 
have a military career background. Indeed, many non-
democratic leaders wear the uniform to exert political 
control over their militaries (Svolik, 2012, p. 11). 
The Cursus Honorum data also allow us to compare 
leaders in terms of the length of their political careers, 
whether in formal politics or in politics in general. The 
second category, years in politics prior to assuming the 
highest political office, additionally includes years in 
civil service and any politics-related activity from the 
time of joining the party or movement, for instance. As 
can be seen from Figure 3, democratic leaders enjoy 
lengthier political careers, whether in formal politics or 
in general: on average they clock 16 and 19 years ver-
sus those in non-democracies who manage 9 and 12 
years, respectively. However, many leaders in dictator-
ships are perhaps more connected: 8 per cent are rela-
tives of the previous ruler, albeit many of them—but 
not all—are found in monarchies, as expected. 
From the data, we can also compare various ways 
under which leaders may assume, or lose, their office. 
Figure 4 shows that the majority of leaders in democ-
racies assume office via regular means, either as a re-
sult of election—57 per cent—or selection in parlia-
ment—35 per cent. By contrast, only 22 and 6 per cent 
of leaders in dictatorships assume office as a result of 
elections or within the legislature. Instead, 25 per cent 
come to power through a coup and 18 per cent are se-
lected, i.e., chosen by members of the military junta, at 
politburo meetings, etc.10 Leaders can also assume of-
fice as the result of royal succession in monarchies; as a 
                                                          
10 In cases where it is difficult to assign a single category to the 
type of entry, two categories may be assigned, e.g., a ruler can 
enter through the process of a constitutional succession and a 
coup at the same time. Consider Arosemena Monroy (1961–
63) of Ecuador who participated in the rebellion against his 
president (Lentz, 1994, p. 238). After a coup, Monroy, as vice 
president, assumed presidential office (hence the entry is cate-
gorised as constitutional succession and coup). 
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Figure 3. Prior career and posts of political leaders. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders in democracy and 
dictatorship with particular career and professional traits, except for Years in formal politics and Years, including in civil 
service that report the average values instead. Categories are not mutually exclusive. Categories are sorted by differ-
ences between leaders who enter in more and less democratic regimes. 
result of the explicit choice of the preceding ruler, de-
dazo, e.g., Mexico prior to 2000 (this category can be 
collapsed together with selection); they can be in-
stalled by, or enter office with the significant assis-
tance of, a foreign power (e.g., Babrak Karmal in 
1979, Mohammad Najibullah in 1986 and Hamid Kar-
zai in 2001—all in Afghanistan). Every tenth leader in 
the data is designated as interim. Such leaders enter 
office typically following the death, incapacity or res-
ignation of the preceding leader and remain in that 
office for a short duration, usually less than a year, 
and resign afterwards.11 
                                                          
11 For example, the Senate speaker of Gabon, Rogombé, as-
sumed the office of interim head of state for four months after 
President Bongo died in 2009 only to return to her previous 
post in the Senate when the new ruler was sworn in. Likewise, 
some military leaders are also considered interim whenever 
they, shortly after assuming power, declare that democratic 
elections are to be held and then exclude themselves from 
such elections (e.g., General Abraham of Haiti in 1990). In 
monarchies, a regent who serves shorter than one year is also 
regarded as interim. 
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Figure 4. Entry and exit in democracy and dictatorship. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders who enter or exit 
office in democracy and dictatorship under each category. Categories are mutually exclusive and are sorted by differ-
ences between leaders who enter in more and less democratic regimes. 
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The majority of democratic leaders also leave office in 
a regular manner: 39 per cent resign even though they 
could have remained in politics, 22 per cent comply 
with term limits, and 22 per cent lose election and 
leave. In contrast, politics in dictatorships is more vio-
lent: 28 per cent lose office in a coup, 7 per cent as a 
result of revolt or civil war and 3 per cent are killed (Iq-
bal & Zorn, 2008). Nine per cent die in office.12 Still, 
many nondemocratic leaders leave office in a regular 
manner: 10 per cent comply with term limits (Baturo, 
2014), 25 per cent resign peacefully, and 3 per cent 
lose elections. Also, excluding leaders who die in office 
or are forced into exile or are imprisoned, overall half 
of former rulers remain in politics while on average 8 
per cent turn to business, 10 per cent primarily engage 
in non-governmental and charitable activities or turn to 
academic work, and 7 per cent are civil servants, e.g., 
ambassadors. 
Until now, I have relied on descriptive statistics to 
explore the main differences between leaders in de-
mocracies and dictatorships. Political regimes are more 
likely to “select” as their leaders those individuals who 
share particular background traits, e.g., former or cur-
rent military officers in dictatorships or former solici-
tors in democracies. However, apart from political re-
gimes other factors may equally influence the selection 
of leaders. For example, different ruling coalitions may 
face different security environments when choosing 
their leaders so that at the time of war or insurgency 
military officers are elevated.13 Similarly, economic cri-
ses, regime institutionalisation, country governability 
may equally matter in leader selection.  
As a simple test to account for possible omitted fac-
tors, I specify several models to predict whether lead-
ers with specific traits enter office. The independent 
variables are Polity2 and Regime durability to account 
for democracy and regime strength (Marshall & Jag-
gers, 2011), Cold war dummy, War—for an armed con-
flict with at least 25 battle-related deaths (Gleditsch, 
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), 
GDP per capita (log)—all with the values for the first 
year in office, and the Economic growth in a year prior 
to assuming office (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2012). 
Since the data set includes more than 50 indicators, I 
choose six dependent variables that appear to differen-
tiate democrats and dictators, as seen from Figures 1 
to 3: Family background, middle, Revolutionary back-
ground, Law degree, Economics, Military career, Years 
in politics (in general). Probit models are fitted to pre-
dict all but Years in politics where the Poisson regres-
sion is used; models use robust standard errors clus-
                                                          
12 In the majority of cases this category is a death in office, with 
few exceptions being whenever a leader was so severely inca-
pacitated that he could not continue in office, e.g., Ariel Sharon 
of Israel in 2006. 
13 I thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
tered by country. 
Table 2, columns 1–6 display the results. In brief, 
leaders with a revolutionary background are more like-
ly to emerge in less durable—or new—regimes, more 
democratic regimes are more likely to select more ex-
perienced leaders, leaders with law and economics de-
grees, while non-democratic ones promote those with 
military careers. There are also more leaders with 
backgrounds in economics after the end of the Cold 
war. There is no systematic evidence that military con-
flict or economic crises tend to elevate leaders with 
specific traits, however. Also, Family status is too idio-
syncratic to be explained by the chosen predictors. 
In general, democratic leaders do appear to be 
more experienced: they serve longer in various political 
posts, are more likely to occupy significant posts in the 
past. Do leaders across different nondemocratic re-
gimes also differ in terms of their background, experi-
ence, and traits? The section that follows briefly com-
pares leaders across dictatorships. 
4. Leaders and their Careers in Dictatorships 
In a path-setting study of non-democratic regimes, 
Geddes (1999) argued that significant differences 
among dictatorships can be explained by the strength 
of autonomous political institutions and by different 
incentive structures in personal, party, and military dic-
tatorships. Scholars find that single-party regimes are 
generally most durable (Gandhi, 2008). One of the rea-
sons behind their resilience is that political elites in 
such regimes are all co-opted under one umbrella or-
ganisation—single party, and all have a vested interest 
in regime continuity. Lower-ranked officials first per-
form a lengthy and costly service for the party while 
climbing the career ladder, later capitalising on their 
prior career when they reach the higher levels of party 
hierarchy (Svolik, 2012, pp. 168-169). Similarly, in 
democratic polities it is very unusual to climb to the 
summit of power without progressing through a num-
ber of steps in the political career (Eulau & 
Czudnowski, 1972). Likewise, in more institutionalised 
non-democratic regimes, e.g., USSR or contemporary 
China, the careers of future leaders span decades in 
the lower offices. We should expect, therefore, that 
political leaders in party regimes will have more politi-
cal experience than those in personal regimes, and cer-
tainly more than those in military administrations.  
Even though leaders in nondemocratic regimes 
primarily choose policies that prolong their survival in 
office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Tullock, 1987), 
dictators’ motives may be more complicated. Some 
leaders may also aim to maximise their personal con-
sumption (Wintrobe, 1998, p. 79). It is conceivable that 
the observed heterogeneity among dictators, with 
some being more benevolent and others—kleptocratic, 
may in part be driven by their diverse backgrounds. For 
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Table 2. Leaders and their background in democracy and dictatorship. 
 All Countries: Dictatorships: 





















Polity2 0.010 0.020 0.055*** 0.042*** -0.107*** 0.037***       
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)       
Cold war 0.025 -0.057 0.409*** -0.459*** 0.348** 0.128** 0.077 -0.366** 0.163 0.579** -0.205 -0.153 
 (0.081) (0.136) (0.088) (0.102) (0.128) (0.049) (0.175) (0.169) (0.246) (0.195) (0.205) (0.128) 
War -0.048 0.408+ -0.139 0.055 0.064 0.000 0.064 0.757*** -0.053 -0.251 -0.347 -0.071 
 (0.116) (0.218) (0.142) (0.171) (0.175) (0.077) (0.182) (0.198) (0.168) (0.165) (0.218) (0.113) 
Income pc (log) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000+ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000+ 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Econ. growth, t-1 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.004 0.009+ -0.008 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.026** 0.010 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) 
Regime durability -0.002 -0.010** 0.001 -0.001 -0.010+ 0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.008 -0.006 0.009 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) 
Military regime       0.587** -0.810** -0.284 0.768*** -0.497** -0.426** 
       (0.208) (0.278) (0.244) (0.222) (0.246) (0.206) 
Monarchy       -1.227** – -0.602 -1.465** – -0.824+ 
       (0.586)  (0.647) (0.648)  (0.468) 
Single party       0.190 0.588** 0.062 -0.421 0.234 0.349** 
       (0.251) (0.269) (0.234) (0.258) (0.226) (0.170) 
Constant 0.230** -0.910*** -1.049*** -1.172*** -0.619*** 2.365*** -0.147 -0.650** -1.085*** -0.022 -0.744** 2.212*** 
 (0.098) (0.170) (0.104) (0.119) (0.149) (0.073) (0.222) (0.249) (0.242) (0.216) (0.244) (0.160) 
N 1187 1182 1187 1187 1186 1177 346 333 346 345 333 345 
N of countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 95 88 95 95 88 95 
χ² 2.638 33.404 60.387 78.628 172.491 103.283 24.717 68.203 5.030 61.894 28.282 75.819 
Notes: Columns 1–5 and 7–11 report the results of probit regression models with the dependent variables indicated in the top row; columns 6 and 12 are Poisson regres-
sion models with the count of years in politics, including in civil service, as the dependent variable. All variables are for the year of entry in office, Economic growth is for 
the year preceding entry into office. Monarchy predicts failure perfectly and is therefore omitted in Models 8 and 11. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses + 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. 
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instance, Brazilian military leaders from 1964–85 who 
arguably opted for economic development over per-
sonal enrichment were different from rulers in other 
military regimes in that they all came from secure 
wealthy and middle-class backgrounds, many receiving 
an excellent education in the War College (Skidmore, 
1988). Admittedly, it is equally possible that the per-
sonal background of dictators is unrelated to their be-
haviour in office. With the assistance of the new data, 
this question can be addressed empirically. As a first 
test, in this section I only compare whether different 
types of dictatorships are associated with different 
types of dictators. Leaders of military, monarchies, sin-
gle-party, personal nondemocratic regimes are as-
signed into four different types using the data from 
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012). Regimes are catego-
rised for the first year in office of each ruler. 
Because almost all leaders of military regimes have 
undertaken a military education, Figure 5 only com-
pares education background of leaders in personal and 
party dictatorships instead. The differences in educa-
tional backgrounds among party rulers and personal 
rulers are not significant: every third leader has no uni-
versity education in both regime types, 15 and 18 per 
cent in personal and party regimes have a law back-
ground, while the differences in terms of other catego-
ries are small. The only difference that stands out is 
that 18 per cent of leaders in personal regimes have 
undergone military education as opposed to 10 per 
cent only of those in party regimes. In turn, Figure 6 
charts differences in career paths in more and less in-
stitutionalised dictatorships, i.e., in party and personal 
rulerships. As expected, the main difference is that 
personal rulers are more likely to have careers in mili-
tary and security, while the experience of party leaders 
lies within the party or legislature. 
Comparative scholarship has found that personalist 
regimes are markedly different from other nondemo-
cratic regimes (e.g., Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015; 
Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 
2008). The descriptive statistics displayed in Figures 5 
and 6 suggest that differences in the educational and 
professional profiles of party rulers and personal dicta-
tors are not dramatic. It is therefore very likely that 
personal dictatorships stand out because of the rela-
tive lack of constraints on their rulers—relative to oth-
er regime types—not because of differences in rulers’ 
traits. 
 
Figure 5. Are personalist dictators different from party rulers? Educational background. Note: Categories report per-
centage of leaders under each category in different regimes, only the most numerous categories are included. 
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Figure 6. Are personalist dictators different from party rulers? Career background. Note: Categories report percentage 
of leaders under each category in different regimes, only the most numerous categories are included. 
What is noticeable, however, is that dictators in differ-
ent regime types may be “recruited” from different 
family class backgrounds. Figure 7 compares the family 
backgrounds of rulers in military, party, and personal 
dictatorships. Monarchies are omitted since their rul-
ers come from upper family background by definition. 
The differences are quite stark: 67 per cent of leaders 
in military regimes hail from a middle-class family 
background, as opposed to 46 and 42 per cent only in 
party and personal dictatorships respectively. There 
are also only 17 per cent of military rulers with lower 
class backgrounds, as opposed to 38 and 41 per cent in 
other regime types. These differences are also statisti-
cally significant based on the chi-square test of associa-
tion. Does this finding go beyond the question of selec-
tion effect of different regimes, i.e., does family 
background also matter for policy outcomes? We know 
that the socioeconomic family background of democrat-
ic leaders affect their economic policy preferences (Hayo 
& Neumeier, 2014). In a study that examines presidents, 
Baturo (2014) shows that calculations to remain in office 
depend on, inter alia, personal concerns over future 
immunity and status. Further studies may also examine 
if military leaders with more secure family backgrounds 
are associated with different policies or whether such 
leaders are more inclined to retire to a life of compara-
ble status as opposed to clinging onto office. 
We can also compare leaders’ experience. Figure 8 
charts political experience in different dictatorships. It 
turns out that rulers of party regimes must indeed 
climb the “greasy pole” the longest: their average time 
in formal politics is 12 years (17 years in politics in to-
tal), as opposed to six years (9 years total) in personal 
regimes, and only four years (6 altogether) in military 
juntas. The median length of experience is 2–3 years 
shorter than the average length across all four regime 
types. In the section that follows, I discuss whether po-
litical experience matters and suggest possible venues 
for future research. 
Earlier I compared democratic and less democratic 
leaders using regression models. Similarly, we can 
compare across non-democratic regimes only. The sole 
difference is that instead of Polity 2, models 7–12 in 
Table 2 include three regime types as independent var-
iables with Personalist regime as the baseline omitted 
category. Also, instead of Economics degree that is un-
common in dictatorships, I predict whether particular 
dictatorships are more likely to be governed by former 
“No 2s”, i.e., prime-ministers, vice-presidents, other of-
ficials ranked second formally (e.g., party’s second sec-
retary in party regimes). 
The results displayed in Table 2 indicate that lead-
ers of military regimes are more likely to share the 
middle-class family background, (not surprisingly) have 
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prior military career, be less experienced and not come 
from “No 2” positions. In turn, leaders of party regimes 
are more likely to participate in revolutionary move-
ments and have more years of experience in politics. In 
general, more durable regimes with more developed 
economies are also more likely to have more experi-
enced leaders, while “No 2s” are more likely to assume 
office at a time of economic growth. Overall, I interpret 
the results to indicate that more institutionalised dicta-
torships “select” more experienced leaders. 
The Cursus Honorum data also include indicators 
for the highest military ranks attained prior to assum-
ing office. Additionally, the ranks are “normalised” as 
NATO military ranks, i.e., the equivalent of the highest 
obtained rank, according to the NATO classification, 
from OR-4 to OF-10, where OF-1 to OF-5 are the ranks 
from lieutenant to colonel; OF-6 is brigadier general 
(generally, any 1-star general, including major-generals 
and rear-admirals); OF-7 is any 2-star general or admi-
ral, can be also called division general, or lieutenant (2-
star) general, or brigadier-general (Argentina) or major 
(2-star) general in some militaries; OF-8 is division (3-
star) general, or lieutenant (3-star) general, or colonel-
general (3-star);14 OF-9 is any 4-star general, usually 
army general or in some cases lieutenant-general;15 
OF-10 is a field marshall or a 5-star general. Finally, 
while there is no NATO classification on the further 
ranks, two generalissimo in the dataset, Franco of 
Spain and Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwan, are entered as 
OF-11. 
                                                          
14 As OF-6, brigadier general (1-star general) is generally equiv-
alent to major-general (1-star general). Lieutenant-general (3-
star general) in most militaries is categorised as OF-8, however, 
OF-8 is equivalent to colonel-general in the USSR and its satel-
lites prior to 1989 (where lieutenant-general is a 2-star general 
instead). Since 1943, colonel-generals in USSR have worn three 
stars, so Pettibone (2009, p. 905) compares this rank to the US 
lieutenant general. 
15 Similar adjustments are made for other nations, for instance, 
lieutenant-general is the highest obtainable rank in the Argen-
tine military, therefore it is categorised as OF-9. 
 
Figure 7. Family background of dictators. Note: Categories report percentage of leaders under each category of family 
class background. Monarchy is omitted as almost all monarchs are in the upper class category. 
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Figure 8. Political experience in dictatorship. Note: Vertical axis indicates years of experience prior to assuming office. 
The white line in the middle is the median number of years in each category. 
 
Figure 9. Military ranks of leaders in military and personal dictatorships. Note: Military ranks at the time of assuming of-
fice or retirement from the military, if prior to assuming office. Where leaders obtain a higher military rank while in of-
fice, such ranks are ignored. Categories report percentage of current or former military officers with particular ranks 
who assume office in two regime types. OF-1 to OF-10 are standardised NATO ranks. 
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By way of illustration, Figure 9 displays differences in 
the military ranks of leaders in military and personal 
dictatorships at the time of assuming office. It gives ev-
idence that in the majority of military regimes, it is 
close to impossible for those in lower ranks to seize 
power. Altogether, only 30 per cent of leaders in mili-
tary regimes hold the rank of colonel or below, in con-
trast to 63 per cent of such leaders who hold ranks in 
personal regimes. Therefore, only 37 per cent of lead-
ers with military ranks in personal regimes are generals 
at the time of assuming office, in contrast to 70 per 
cent in military regimes. Figure 9 indicates that elite 
coalitions that seize power to establish military re-
gimes, or military leaders who succeed in office in al-
ready existing military regimes typically come from 
more institutionalised and hierarchical military organi-
sations. In military regimes, those officers from the 
highest ranks become political leaders while lower-
ranked officers remain subordinates. In contrast, in less 
centralised militaries even lower-ranking officers have 
a chance at seizing power and becoming “military 
strongmen” themselves (Geddes, 1999; Weeks, 2012). 
For example, the military junta that overthrew Presi-
dent Mamadou Tandja of Niger in 2010 was headed by 
a mere platoon commander, Major Salou Djibo who 
was apparently outranked by several officers.16 
5. Conclusion: The Cursus Honorum and the Study of 
Political Leaders 
While studies exist that examined whether leaders in 
democracies and dictatorships have different personal 
and educational backgrounds (e.g., Besley & Reynal-
Querol, 2011; Bienen & van de Walle, 1991; Dreher et 
al., 2009; Eulau & Czudnowski, 1972; Pérez-Liñán, 
2009), there are no systematic studies that examined 
leaders’ careers and background across different types 
of dictatorships. This paper begins to fill the gap. Over-
all, leaders in party regimes, in terms of their careers 
and experience, have more in common with democrat-
ic leaders than with other dictators. Does political ex-
perience matter? While longer political careers in party 
dictatorships are determined by the hierarchical as-
signment of service and benefit (Svolik, 2012, p. 168), 
such longer political socialisation may in turn influence 
leaders’ ability to work through existing rules and pro-
cedures and make policy compromises, which in turn 
may influence the observed policy outcomes in single-
party regimes. Also, Bienen and van de Walle (1991, 
pp. 51-52) acknowledge that leadership skills and abil-
ity to survive in office become evident only once lead-
ers assume power, so that those leaders who survive 
lengthy periods in office can be attributed such skills ad 
hoc. One possible venue for future research is to exam-
ine whether lengthier political experience, or other 
                                                          
16 See Nossiter (2010). 
background traits and prior careers, contribute to the 
explanation of political survival in dictatorships. Like-
wise, we do not know whether dictators who succeed 
in overtaking their regimes and turning them into their 
own personal autocracies (Svolik, 2012, p. 56) all share 
particular leadership skills that may be related to their 
life experiences and background, or whether their suc-
cess is driven by idiosyncratic factors. While the exami-
nation of leaders’ effects is beyond the scope of this 
paper, further research may turn to the Cursus Hono-
rum to study whether leaders’ traits matter. 
Even though studies exist that attempt to trace ob-
servable policy outcomes to leaders’ background at-
tributes and life experiences (Besley, Montalvo, & 
Reynal-Querol, 2011; Dreher et al., 2009; Hayo & 
Neumeier, 2014; Horowitz & Stam, 2014), the effects 
of leaders’ personal traits are however difficult to iden-
tify and separate from those of the effects of office oc-
cupied by such leaders, of their regimes, or overall con-
text. As Blondel (1987, pp. 4-5) has remarked, “the 
impact of leaders depends on the environment…some 
have even said that leaders are prisoners of that envi-
ronment, in that they can do only what the environment 
‘allows’ them to do.” The first hurdle in examining lead-
ers’ effects therefore is to distinguish between leaders’ 
own effects and those of the offices they occupy (Baturo 
& Elkink, 2014). Leaders’ commands and policy prefer-
ences have also to be transmitted to, and implemented 
by their followers (Baturo & Mikhaylov, 2013). Scholars 
must equally account for context, as crises and other 
events may dictate what leaders respond to, while cus-
tomary practices dictate whether or not leaders should 
intervene at all (Blondel, 1987, p. 7). As an illustration, 
the lack of positive effects on the economy by leaders 
with a superior economics education may not necessari-
ly render such leaders incompetent or their education 
unimportant; it may simply imply that they cannot, or 
decide not, to intervene in the economy. 
In practice, scholars are more confident when they 
focus on policies and behaviours where leaders’ own 
personal impact may be separated from that of other 
players or from the overall context, as opposed to out-
comes largely determined by the environment, where 
the implementation of leaders’ preferences may be 
impossible or outside of their control, such as inflation. 
Instead, for example, Horowitz and Stam (2014) examine 
the influence of leaders’ personal traits on the likelihood 
of conflict initiation, while Baturo (2014) focuses on 
leaders’ compliance with term limits. Indeed, while the 
vagaries of the economy are largely outside of their con-
trol, many leaders—especially those in dictatorships—
have more personal leverage over the direction of for-
eign policy, including war declaration; they also decide 
personally whether or not to prolong their time in office. 
Overall, in non-democratic regimes, and especially 
in more personalised regimes, rulers typically have 
more policy discretion and fewer institutional con-
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straints. All things being equal, in less institutionalised 
settings with fewer veto players, i.e., dictatorships, the 
personal effects of leaders therefore should be easier to 
identify from those of other actors and contexts. Many 
comparativists find that personal dictatorships differ 
from party and military regimes in terms of their policies 
(e.g., Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2015; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 
2012; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 2008). As briefly discussed 
in the previous section, Figures 5–6 do not display dra-
matic differences between party and personal rulers. 
Still, the lack of average differences across regime types 
does not render leaders’ traits unimportant. For in-
stance, among dictatorships, personalist regimes experi-
ence the highest degree of policy volatility (Frantz & 
Ezrow, 2011). Such observed volatility may be driven not 
only by the absence of constraints but also by a more 
pronounced random element, i.e., by within-regime type 
differences among different personal dictators in terms 
of their policy preferences and competence. 
With the assistance of the Cursus Honorum, future 
studies may include such factors in their explanation. 
While there may be a debate as to whether leaders 
matter or if their effects may be identified at all, e.g., 
whether better education of leaders indeed accounts 
for policy competence (e.g., Besley & Reynal-Querol, 
2011), or not (e.g., Carnes & Lupu, 2015), the data on 
leaders’ educational attainment is necessary in order 
to have such a debate in the first place. This paper in-
troduced the new and detailed data about personal 
characteristics and careers of political leaders. Other 
scholars may build on this data to study leadership. For 
instance, the data may be used to better understand 
the democratic breakdown or “revolving door” prob-
lem. Baturo (2014, pp. 187-211) examined compliance 
of presidents with term limits and found that while cer-
tain details, such as military background, being the fa-
ther of a newly-independent nation or political outsid-
er are associated with non-compliance, the effects of 
personal traits are inconsistent once regime selection 
effects are accounted for. Likewise, Baturo (in press) 
studied whether the availability of career options in re-
tirement strengthened the rotation in office norm, 
while Baturo and Mikhaylov (2016) analysed whether 
the business careers of former leaders raise any con-
cerns over democratic accountability. 
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